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MIGRATION FROM CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE AND 
SOCIETAL SECURITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
 
 
Following the end of the Cold War, terrorism, cross-border crime, drug-trafficking, and 
immigration have replaced traditional frontier disputes as main sources of insecurity for the 
countries of the European Union.  The main debates surrounding the movement of people 
have focused on the strict control of immigration and minimizing the number of asylum 
seekers – the creation of a so-called “Fortress Europe” – and the links made between 
security, criminality and migration.  No longer associated solely with labor market 
dislocations, humanitarian reasons, and social integration concerns, migration has become 
part of the new national security agendas of the receiving and transit countries.  Thus, the 
perceived threats to economic well-being, social order, cultural and religious values, and 
political stability have placed migration policies within a framework intended to protect the 
societies of Western Europe.    
 
The spotlight in the public discourse has been on asylum and illegal immigration 
from the developing countries.  Immigration from the Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEECs), most of them soon to become members of the Union, remains sidelined 
by the more conspicuous cases of racially, ethnically, or religiously charged immigration 
from developing countries, who are perceived as a challenge to the identity of the recipient 
societies as well as to their social and economic well-being.  This paper will attempt to 
discuss how immigration to the European Union from the CEECs is securitized and will 
argue that this process takes place primarily along the dimension of social welfare, rather 
than cultural identity.  
 
 
Migration and Societal Security 
 
The issue of migration touches upon central concepts, such as borders and border politics, 
security, sovereignty, citizenship and identity, the nature of which has been changing under 
the pressure of globalization and integration.  Over the last 50 years, net migration in the 
European Union peaked in 1992, reaching 1,350,000 persons, then steadily declined until 
1997 to 530,000, and again in 2000 to 680,000.   Inward migration is the main component 
of population growth in the European Union, accounting for approximately seventy percent 
of its increase.
1   
 
While immigration is not a new phenomenon, during the last two decades there has 
been an incremental shift toward the politicization and securitization of the issue.  This has 
taken place in a context in which growing foreigner populations have gradually given rise 
to public perceptions of cultural, economic, and security threats to West European societies. 
Although not a threat to the state itself, during the 1990s, migration has become one of the 
perceived dangers to domestic public order, i.e., it has come to be seen as a security 
problem along with drug-trafficking, organized crime, and terrorism.  
                                                           
1 Eurostat.  News Release: Population of the EU in 2000.  No.86/2001 – 10 Aug 2001; Eurostat.  News 
Release: As a Result of Net Migration EU Population Slightly Up in 1999.  No.96/2000.  11 Aug 2000; 
Eurostat. New Release: Faster Growth of EU Population in 2000.  No. 4/2001 – 8 Jan 2001. 
  3 
  
The concepts of societal security and securitization are linked to the wider definition 
of security that emerged after the end of the Cold War, two of the most prominent 
proponents of which are Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan.  They argue that security is about 
survival in the face of an existential threat to the referent object, whether it is the state, 
sovereignty, or the nation, among others.  Wæver maintains that security is a speech act; an 
issue becomes a matter of security when it is presented as such, not necessarily because in 
reality it exists as such.  This threat to society requires a specific response and perhaps even 
emergency actions.   Both the perception of the threat and the necessity of express measures 
have to be accepted by significant portions of society, who, in their willingness to take 
action, become security agents.  Since society consists of various groups, someone has to 
speak for society, or as is most often the case, in the name of society, a task usually done by 
political actors or other community leaders.  The elites play a critical role in turning an 
issue into a security problem, i.e., securitizing it, as it also enables them to claim the right 
over how to handle it.
2  
 
Existential threats differ according to the character of the referent object, which 
vary within the different sectors, society being one of them.   In the societal sector the 
referent objects are large-scale collective identities, which evolve in conjunction with 
internal and external developments.  Hence, the framing of an issue as a societal security 
problem depends upon how members of these groups see the creation and maintenance of 
their collective identities.  Societal security, then, is about the preservation of traditional 
patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity, within 
acceptable conditions for evolution. In other words, societal security is about “large, self-
sustaining identity groups.”
3  Society, which according to Wæver is about identity, its self-
conception as a community, and the individuals who identify themselves as members of 
this society, begins to see itself as a security agent under threat.  Although this does not 
mean that society’s identity is at the core of the concept of international security, it can 
nonetheless be a referent for security action – it is the defining point for existential threats 
for societies because it determines whether the group has been able to sustain itself.  Hence, 
identity is a powerful concept, the appeal to which makes security discourse possible.
4   
 
Within this framework, immigration represents a threat to society’s identity.  While 
Buzan and Wæver do not address identity formation in a detailed manner, they refer to the 
importance of the “other” in creating, maintaining, and reinforcing identities.  Since 
security is a socially constructed concept, groups in part “create” each other in an 
intersubjective relationship, projecting their fears onto the “other” in the process.
5 
Immigration helps provide the new “other” in West European societies, legitimizing the 
need for restrictive measures as a response to the perceived danger.  The formulation of any 
immigration policy is thus contingent upon the political debates to define the identities of 
large ethno-religious and political groups and their boundaries.
6 
 
                                                           
2 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis.  Boulder and 
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998: 24-27; Ole Waever, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” On 
Security, ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz (New York: Columbia Press University, 1995): 54-55. 
3 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 119. 
4 Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, “Slippery?  Contradictory?  Sociologically Untenable?  The Copenhagen 
School Replies,” Review of International Studies  23 (1997): 242-9. 
5 Ronnie D. Lipschutz, “On Security,” On Security.  (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995): 10. 
  4 
6 Andrea Grove, “Immigration and Refugee Policy as a Debate Over Identity: A Choice Between the 
Inclusivist Normative Order and the Exclusivist Knee-Jerk Reaction?” International Politics  38 (2001): 583. Securitization refers to a process during which “the issue is presented as an 
existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal 
bounds of political procedure.”
7  Securitization follows politicization, in other words, an 
issue first has to become the subject of political debate and governmental action.   
Therefore, whether an issue is the focus of more or less intense form of public debate and 
urgent governmental action depends upon the context within which these developments 
take place.  Political or economic uncertainties, and even more importantly, the efforts of 
political actors to set the agenda, usually facilitate the shift from politicization to 
securitization.
8 
 
As European integration deepens and the member states pool their sovereignties in a 
growing number of areas, there is a growing perception that the member states cannot 
adequately protect their societies as a result of their borderless frontiers, resulting in an 
increasing societal insecurity.  In other words, significant groups in society feel threatened, 
and immigrants as well as refugees are often seen as having no legitimate right to social 
assistance and welfare provisions.  The calls for curtailing the social rights of immigrants is 
linked to the idea that immigration is a threat to cultural homogeneity as well as to the 
preservation of the welfare state.
9  Hence, within the EU context, the issue of migration has 
been securitized along the dimensions of cultural identity and welfare provisions as part of 
the overall societal security of the internal market. 
 
The Securitization of Migration in the European Union 
 
It has been argued that the European integration process is implicated in the social 
construction of migration as a security question as well as in the development of restrictive 
migration policies.  The securitization of migration does not take place in isolation, but is 
part of the wider politicization of immigrants and asylum seekers as destabilizing for 
society’s collective identity and welfare, in which professional agencies and political agents 
decide the criteria for legitimate membership in a society.  In other words, the securitization 
of migration is a structural effect of the multiple practices of various actors involved in 
policy-making.
10    
 
Jef Huysmans argues that in the EU the securitization of migration has occurred 
mainly along two dimensions: identity and welfare provisions.   This view appears to agree 
with Wæver’s argument that immigration threatens the collective identity of a society, and 
by association, the welfare state.  He argues that as immigrants are not part of “us,” 
therefore, they should not benefit from the welfare state, which rightfully belongs only to 
nationals.  In other words, the notions of social solidarity and distribution of welfare 
become intertwined with notions of nationality and citizenship.  Since immigrants and 
refugees are not citizens of a member state, they are not seen as members of that 
community, and therefore, should not fully share the benefits of the internal market, such as 
                                                           
7 Buzan, Wæver, and de Walde 23-4. 
8 Ibid.; Grove 590. 
9 Jef Huysmans,. “The European Union and Securitization of Migration,” Journal of Common Market Studies  
38.5 (2000): 756-8. 
10 Ibid. 758. 
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 free movement and welfare provisions.  This linkage between nationality and welfare 
entitlements is what Huysmans refers to as “welfare chauvinism.”
11  
 
Most often this process takes place within the political discourse, where the 
securitization of an issue enables actors to propose means for finding a solution for the 
security problem.
12  Since security is constructed through language, the way an issue is 
discussed determines the structure of the discourse, which potentially can affect political 
and social life.  A particularly important factor in this process is the role of the media, 
which often facilitates the definition of “us” and “them,” by highlighting the cultural and 
religious differences in memorable sound-bytes.  In addition to its role in the construction 
of political questions, the media act as a mediator between the public and the political 
establishment.  Media representations of immigrants and asylum seekers is frequently 
referred to by political actors, especially during electoral campaigns, which enables them to 
propose restrictive measures as a solution to the problems that immigrants and asylum 
seekers present to the host societies.       
 
Perhaps the most famous example of presenting immigration as a threat to society 
has been Jörg Heider.  He has stated that “Austria has no need of any artificially induced 
multicultural society,” and that “everyone has a right to a dignified existence, but in their 
own country.”
13 His frequently expressed anti-immigrant position, expressed as concern for 
the preservation of Austrian identity and scarce jobs, contributed to his rise in popularity 
and enabled his Freedom Party to achieve electoral success.  Anti-immigrant sentiments 
have been articulated by community leaders and political actors at both regional and state 
levels, and can also be detected in international conventions.  Most recently, for example, 
after the deportation of more than 1,300 illegal immigrants from Eastern Europe and North 
Africa, Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi declared that “citizens’ security is a top priority 
for the government,” and that “being free from fear is every citizen’s first right and the 
government’s goal is to cut back on crime.”
14 While in past decades, primarily right-wing 
politicians resorted to immigration, in the 1990s, political and economic circumstances 
favorable to anti-immigrant rhetoric has made it a subject for public debate even in 
countries which have long been considered to have the least anti-immigrant and xenophobic 
attitudes, such as Denmark and the Netherlands. On a European level, one of the best 
examples of the secutirization of migration is the 1990 Convention Applying the Schengen 
Agreement of 14 June 1985, which connects migration and asylum with terrorism, 
transnational crime, and border control, and locates it in a framework regulating the 
security of the internal market.
15  On a global scale, the Smuggling Protocol of the 2000 
UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, for example, states that “the ‘migrant’ 
should not be viewed as a blameless victim but, rather, as partly complicit in the act of 
‘illegal migration.’”
16  
 
Although for almost three decades after World War II Europe had relatively liberal 
immigration policies, justified by the need for workers, the 1970s marked the beginning of 
                                                           
11Huysmans,  Journal of Common Market Studies  38.5 (2000): 768; Jef Huysmans, “Contested Community: 
Migration and the Question of the Political in the EU,” International Relations Theory and the Politics of 
European Integration: Power, Security and Community.  Routledge: London and New York, 2000: 161. 
12 Wæver, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” 54-55. 
13 “No Place for Mr. Haider”, The Guardian 8 Nov 2000.  http://www.guardian.co.uk.; and “Haider Rouses 
Italy Against Immigrants,” The Guardian 18 Dec 2000. http://www.guardian.co.uk. 
14 “Italy Deports 1,300 Immigrants,” The Guardian 20 Feb 2002.  http://guardian.co.uk. 
15Huysmans 756. 
  6 
16 See Liz Fekete, The Emergence of Xeno-Racism,” Race and Class 43.2 (2001): 26. a gradual shift toward stricter policies.  This trend continued, necessitated by other 
developments such as the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, and especially the 
opening up of the former Eastern bloc and the wars in former Yugoslavia.  The following 
section will briefly discuss some of the explanations for the upcoming eastern enlargement 
of the European Union and the challenges it presents to the identities and welfare of West 
European societies. 
 
 
Enlargement and Societal Security 
 
Traditionally, the idea of Europe has been linked to three main elements: liberty, 
Christendom, and civilization.
17 Historically, these concepts developed separately, coming 
together only at the end of the eighteenth century, to be challenged again by the violence 
and destruction of the two world wars during the twentieth century.  Perhaps just as 
important in the development of the concept of Europe and European identity has been its 
creation through its relation to significant “others.”
18  
 
The search for the elusive European identity has benefited considerably through its 
juxtaposition to the “other,” which throughout history has usually been “the Turk,” or 
alternatively, Russia.  In addition to the fact that during the Cold War, the political and 
security discord over Europe was couched in East-West terms, liberal democracy, the 
European social model, and anti-communism were the focal points for distinguishing 
Western Europe from the other Europe to the east, where the concept of Europe did not 
carry any significant connotation, nor had any particular utility.
19 The blocked social, 
cultural, and popular transactions in Eastern Europe served to contrast sharply and even 
define the social exchanges in Western Europe, forging commonalities, which facilitated 
integration.
20  During this period there was little interaction between Europe’s two halves, 
giving Eastern Europe only a peripheral place in the West European public consciousness, 
aside from the status of Cold War adversary.  This lack of interaction led many Western 
Europeans to consider Central and Eastern Europeans as not one of “them.”   
 
During the 1980s, the recourses to “Europe” in Eastern Europe became more 
frequent, led by Gorbachev’s notion of the “common European home” and the call for a 
“return to Europe.”  It was during this period that security became linked to culture, history, 
and geography, with the purpose of reinforcing political arguments.
21  Following the end of 
the Cold War, the Eastern European countries undertook a process of political and 
economic transformation, in some cases accompanied by state-building.  With this came 
their drive to join western clubs, led by the European Union and NATO, and simultaneous 
distancing from Russia.  While for the CEECs joining the EU entails substantial economic 
and political benefits, and indicates belonging to the Western community of liberal values, 
the reasons for the European Union to enlarge are more complex. 
 
                                                           
17 Pim den Boer, “Europe to 1914: the Making of an Idea,” The History of the Idea of Europe.  Kevin Wilson 
and Jan van der Dussen, eds. (London and New York: 1995): 13. 
18 Wæver, “Europe Since 1945: Crisis to Renewal”203; See also Anthony Smith, “National Identity and the 
Idea of European Unity,” International Affairs. 68.1 (1992): 55-76. 
19Wæver, “Europe Since 1945: Crisis to Renewal” 160. 
20 Helen Wallace, “Whose Europe is it Anyway? The 1998 Stein Rokkan Lecture.”  European Journal of 
Political Research  35 (1999): 293-5. 
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21 Wæver, “Europe Since 1945: Crisis to Renewal” 179. Enlargement holds the possibility of very tangible political and economic benefits, 
namely, increased stability, security, and prosperity.  As some studies show, however, the 
expected costs of eastern enlargement exceed the immediate potential benefits.  Although 
the enlargement will increase the size of the internal market and thus benefit the European 
economies in the aggregate, at the time being these gains can and are being extracted from 
the candidates without the benefits of full membership for them.
22   
 
Along with the political and economic gains, there are strong arguments of 
historical and moral obligation towards Central and Eastern Europe.  Normative theoretical 
approaches emphasize the values and traditions that are seen as constitutive of European 
identity.  These approaches use arguments such as belonging to the European community, 
duty and solidarity towards those seen as “one of us,” as well as inclusion in the club of 
those who adhere to the same liberal values and norms that are part of the EU’s 
postnationalist, liberal identity to explain enlargement.
23 The sense of historical 
responsibility is supported by the so-called “myth of Yalta,” namely, the abandoning of 
Eastern Europe – “the kidnapped West” - to the Soviet Union, one of Europe’s “others.”
24 
While the European Union’s claim is that the rules that govern the enlargement process are 
universal, the officially stated aim of the EU’s relations with Eastern Europe is to overcome 
the division of the two parts of the same entity.  The underlying argument is that Eastern 
Europe is a part of “us” that now must be returned, a kinship duty that is not detected in the 
case of Turkey, for example.   
 
The criteria for accession that the candidates have to meet reflect liberal values and 
norms, suggesting that their adoption by the candidate countries will determine the 
membership and territorial boundaries of the European Union.  In other words, rather than 
looking at the balance sheet of material costs and benefits, the European Union appears to 
grant membership to those countries that come to share the values that lie at the core of its 
liberal collective identity, namely, liberal human rights as expressed in individual freedoms, 
civil liberties, and political rights.
25 By insisting on accomplishing and internalizing these 
values, the project of enlargement also serves to fulfill the EU’s foundational myth of 
ensuring peace and prosperity, thereby enhancing the Union’s legitimacy.
26  The 
enlargement to the east, then, can be seen as a decision made in accordance with the 
normative ideas of the liberal community of the European Union and its historical 
responsibility toward the former Eastern bloc. 
 
                                                           
22 See, for example, Michael J. Baun, A Wider Europe: The Process and Politics of European Union 
Enlargement.  Lanham and Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2000.  
23 Helene Sjursen, “Why Expand?  The Question of Justification in the EU’s enlargement policy,”  ARENA 
Working Papers.  WP 01/6.  http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp01-6.htm 2 July 2001.; Frank 
Schimmelfennig, “Liberal Identity and Postnationalist Inclusion: The Eastern Enlargement of the European 
Union,” Constructing Europe’s Identity: The External Dimension.  Ed. By Lars-Erik Cederman.  (Boulder and 
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001):165-173; Michael J. Baun, A Wider Europe: The Process and 
Politics of European Union Enlargement.  (Lanham and Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 
2000): 8-11. 
24 Sjursen 14-16. 
25 Schimmelfennig 172, 182-3. 
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26 Lykke Friis and Anna Murphy,  “And Never the Twain Shall Meet?’ The EU’s Quest for Legitimacy and 
Enlargement.” International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration: Power, Security, and 
Community.  Ed. Morten Kelstrup and Michael C. Williams.  (London and New York: Routledge, 2000): 
235-6. The actual process of negotiations, however, has been marked by rationalist, self-
maximizing tendencies in the behavior of the current member states.
27 The bargaining 
process showcased the divide among the current members toward enlargement and the only 
reluctant acceptance of the demands of Central and Eastern European countries for full 
membership, especially by those countries least likely to gain from enlargement.  Progress 
in the negotiations has been incremental, with the EU members conducting a very self-
interested bargaining at the internal decision-making on the opportunity-cost distribution of 
the effects of enlargement.  These two tendencies of self-maximizing behavior and 
normatively-driven outcome are also evident in dealing with the following two issues: 
immigration from the CEECs and the free movement of labor after accession. 
 
The official EU emphasis on the unification of the continent and on common values 
and traditions indicates that there is an affinity – or at least a serious attempt to forge one - 
between the Europe’s two parts, whether it is defined historically or culturally, or as 
adherence to the same liberal democratic ideas.  Yet cultural considerations often appear as 
points of potential discord, or as an explanation for some of these countries’ difficulties 
with their transitions.  As evidence suggests, the public in the current member states of the 
Union are reluctant receivers of their Eastern and Central European “kin.” Even though the 
contacts between East and West Europeans have increased considerably since 1989, public 
support for enlargement in the current member states remains mediocre.  This outcome is 
reinforced by the fact that this has been and remains an elite-driven project, where the 
feeling of belonging to the same community does not appear to be widespread, nor does the 
prospect of sharing the largess that comes with EU membership receive much support.
28   
 
One of the main reasons for this reluctance is the fear of a “flood” of immigrants 
from Central and Eastern Europe, who as cheap labor would displace local workers, 
thereby causing economic and social dislocations.
29  Again, Jörg Haider is a good example.  
He has long opposed eastern enlargement arguing that “from the moment we open our 
borders, 200,000 people will come here, settle, and look for jobs,”
30 and the equally telling 
statement that “enlargement is a declaration of war on all industrious and other 
hardworking people in Austria.  We demand that the question of enlargement be removed 
from the EU’s agenda,” made as late as 1998.
31 Haider is not so much concerned with 
enlargement’s effects on Austrian identity, rather than with the welfare factor.  This 
tendency is supported by the assumption that since all the Central and Eastern European 
candidates have a majority of Christian population, the social tensions that Islam could 
generate would be avoided.  In general, it appears that whenever cultural differences with 
                                                           
27 Frank Schimmelfennig, “The Double Puzzle of EU Enlargement: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the 
Decision to Expand to the East,” ARENA Working Papers WP  99/15.  
http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp99_15.htm.  9 July 2001. 
28 Even though support for enlargement among the member states’ citizens has grown by 8% during the 
second part of 2001, the average level of support throughout the EU is only 51%, with the highest being in 
Sweden (69%), and the lowest in France (39%).  For more detailed data, see Eurobarometer56 (Autumn 
2001). Annex B1.  Brussels: European Commission Press, 2002.   
29 For example, in 1997, an average of 57% of EU citizens thought that there were too many foreigners living 
in their country, with the highest rate in Greece with 84% and the lowest in Ireland – 17%.  An average of 
66% thought that people coming from Central and Eastern Europe who wish to work in the EU should be 
accepted with restrictions, compared to 17% who thought that they should be accepted without restrictions, 
and 14% percent who thought that they should not be accepted at all.  European Commission.  Results of 
“Continuous Tracking” Surveys of European Union (September 1996 to January 1997).   
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/epo/eo/eo10/eo10gra.pdf. 
30 “Jörg Haider, Austria’s (and Europe’s) Border Guard,” The Economist 11 July 1998:55. 
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31 Jörg Haider, qtd. in Lykke Friis, “Eastern Enlargement, Schengen, JHA and All That…,”1. the CEECs are invoked, they refer to the infusion and strengthening of liberal values, 
something that is not a given, but rather a continuing process.  This is quite different from 
the cultural fundamentalism through which immigration is rendered a threat to the identity 
of EU societies.    
 
Culturalist discourses emphasize that relations between cultures are inherently 
hostile and mutually destructive because ethnocentrism is innate to human nature.  In order 
to avoid conflict between different cultures, it is best to keep them apart.  Thus, cultural 
fundamentalism legitimizes the exclusion of foreigners,
32 which is particularly evident in 
the case of Muslim immigrants and asylum seekers.  In the case of the Central and Eastern 
European countries, this kind of discourse has been largely absent, with most of the 
emphasis on the legacies of communism, including political culture.  
 
The development of political culture is intimately linked to the internalization of 
liberal democratic values, as required by the accession criteria.  The conditionality of 
accession is the primary instrument through which the candidate countries are becoming 
more like “them”, that is, the current member states.  The desire of the current members to 
see not only the candidates, but also the near abroad, become more like “one of us” is 
understandable.
33 The successful transmission of liberal norms to Central and Eastern 
Europe is in the interest not only of international organizations and entities, such as the EU, 
but beneficial for the member states of the European Union as well, since it could bring 
material benefits by creating a zone of peace and stability with consolidated democracies.  
The choice of countries to be admitted by 2004, and perhaps more importantly, the 
exclusion of Bulgaria and Romania from this round, are telling of the strategy of 
privileging those countries that have internalized the values constituting the liberal 
collective identity of the EU with full membership.  The acquis communitaire takes on the 
role of a blue print for the domestic political development of the candidates, and on 
building identities based upon civic values rather than ethnicity or religion.  The paradox 
that emerges is that the exclusion of Bulgaria and Romania due to problems they 
experience with establishing market economies, contradicts the foundational myth of the 
EU in view of the fact that these are the countries that are located in a geographically 
volatile region and in need of support for their democracies, as was the case of the Greek 
and Iberian accessions in the 1980s.  
 
The perception of threat from Central and Eastern European migration after 
enlargement is thus rooted mainly in the fear of large inflows of cheap labor.  The rationale 
behind the fears from an influx of immigrants is not without merit: the economic situation 
following the democratic revolutions of 1989 was rather bleak, and the wage differentials 
between the most prosperous CEECs and poorest EU members still remain significant.  
Furthermore, there was the apprehension that the fragile processes of democratization and 
marketization could collapse, leading to instability in the region.  The possibility that ethnic 
conflicts might explode and spread materialized in the former Yugoslavia, leading to the 
displacement of hundreds of thousands of people, some of whom sought refuge in Western 
Europe, particularly Germany.  For countries such as Spain, Portugal, and France these 
threats were mirrored in the fear of immigration from the Maghreb countries, which 
presented an even higher perceived threat in identity terms.  The fear of trans-border crime 
                                                           
32 Verena Stolke, “New Rhetorics of Exclusion in Europe,” International Social Science Journal. 59: (1999): 
25-27. 
33“Enlargement of the European Union: Impacts on the EU, the Candidates and the ‘Next 
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Neighbors,” ECSA Review 14.1 (Winter 2001): 2-7. came from the supposition that the newly democratic countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe, experiencing deep economic crises and having relatively inefficient judicial 
systems, would become breeding grounds for organized crime, which could then be 
exported to the European Union.
34  
 
Indeed, following the securitization rhetoric of EU officials, and especially member 
states’ leaders, the opening up of the Eastern bloc was seen as threatening to the security of 
the internal market primarily through immigration and crime.  Although instances of crime 
by themselves present threats to individuals and not to society at large, rising crime rates 
are perceived as destabilizing to the domestic public order. For instance, separate crime 
incidents committed by illegal immigrants in Italy provide opportunities for right-wing 
groups to argue for stricter immigration laws, giving them wide public exposure, and a rise 
in electoral fortunes.
35   
 
 
Immigration from the East 
 
Migration studies show that labor movements depend on a variety of factors, broadly 
grouped as “push” and “pull”, which interact in complex ways, making it difficult to 
reliably estimate the flows of labor across borders.  Generally, these factors include the 
income gap between the sending and receiving countries, the situation of the labor markets 
and the demand for services in these countries, proximity, tradition and networks, ethnic 
and political problems, cultural and linguistic barriers, and expectations.
36 Combinations of 
these factors determine the patterns of migration from the East as well as the geography of 
migration.   
 
The number of migrants from the candidate countries constitutes a relatively small 
portion of the overall third-country migration to the EU.  In 1999, the number of candidate 
country nationals who were legally employed in the EU was approximately 290,000 out of 
a total 5,280,000, or 6% of all foreign workers and 0.2% of the labor force. The majority of 
these workers – almost 70% - are in Germany and Austria, where they account for 
approximately 10% of all foreign workers, and 0.4 and 1.2% respectively of the total labor 
force.  The number of undocumented workers and migrants is estimated at approximately 
600,000, most of whom engage in short-term work while abroad (“working tourists”) or 
cross-border trading (“trading tourists”).  The latter group are generally low-cost and 
flexible alternatives to local labor, in other words, the feared cheap labor competing with 
the local workers for scarce jobs, but some of them are engaged in areas already abandoned 
by the local labor, such as household tasks, care, and other personal services.  During the 
1990s, the total number of legal immigrants from the candidate countries to the European 
Union was approximately 830,000, or 15% from all legal immigrants from third-countries, 
and 0.2% of total EU residents.  Hence, clearly the Central and Eastern European countries 
have not been a major source of immigration to the EU
37, and in fact, have fallen short of 
the expectation.  The prevailing pattern of migration from the East appears to be short- or 
medium-term, with the goal of short-term or seasonal work, and concentrated in Central 
Europe. 
                                                           
34 Friis, “Eastern Enlargement, Schengen, JHA, and All That,”4. 
35“A Few Bad Apples,” The Economist.  13-19 Jan 2001: 50-51. 
36 European Commission.  Information Note: The Free Movement of Workers in the Context of Enlargement.  
Annex 1.  Brussels. (6 March 2001): 26-28. 
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37 Ibid.  29-30.  
 
The Securitization of Migration and Policy Implications 
 
Despite the empirical reality, immigration remains a contested issue, allowing for the 
resurgence of right-wing parties and groups in some EU countries.  Anti-immigrant groups 
ranging from labor organizations to right-wing political parties and organizations, advocate 
more restrictive immigration policies, and are particularly opposed to the free movement of 
persons from some Central European countries after their accession.
38   
 
The introduction of security into the discourse of migration further affects policy-
making in this field.  The convergence of restrictive measures at the European level has 
been made possible by presenting immigration as uncontrollable and thus a potential 
security threat.  As a result, policies of stricter border controls are seen as a response to 
security problems and instruments for protecting society and the internal market as a whole.  
Scholars have explored how political elites try to manipulate certain cultural or political 
attributes in order to exclude immigrants.
39  For example, Haider has called for a total halt 
to immigration during an election campaign speech: “There are far too many illegal 
immigrants, crimes and drug dealers – none of them have a place here in Austria.  This has 
to be our priority, to eliminate them uncompromisingly.”
40 At their core, these statements 
contain Haider’s particular ideas about the boundaries between “us” and “them.” They also 
hint at the kind of immigration and asylum policies that he considers necessary.  The 
particular position of Austria as one of the major recipients of immigrants from the East 
created a particular economic and cultural setting, which contributed to the rise of the 
Haider’s Freedom Party to power in the late 1990s.  More importantly, his position 
resonated with a significant portion of Austrian society, which saw itself as the door for 
Eastern and Central Europeans to the European Union.    
 
At the EU-wide level, the position of political parties in the European Parliament 
along the left-right ideological continuum is linked to their attitudes toward immigration as 
well as policy positions.
41 Within the member states, overtly anti-immigrant political 
parties fuel and perpetuate fears of undesirable economic and social impacts caused by the 
unchecked flows of immigrants.  Based upon the appeal of their stringent anti-immigration 
and anti-asylum platforms, right-wing parties in Austria and Italy, for example, have been 
elected into federal and regional governments.  Even more troublesome is the use of anti-
immigrant rhetoric by mainstream parties.  In Denmark, the new government, led by the 
Liberal Party and supported by the far-right Danish People’s Party, raised concerns when it 
made anti-immigrant pledges during a parliamentary campaign.  The campaign waged by 
the Liberal Party focused on an ad, which featured a rape case after which the immigrant 
offenders received relatively light sentences.  The picture showed the young men leaving 
the courthouse, with the caption “It’s time for a change.” In power, the new government has 
promised improvements in the welfare state and pegging taxes, and presented cuts in 
                                                           
 
38 Stratfor (Strategic Forecasting).  “The Return of ‘Fortress Europe?” 
http://www.stratfor.com/home/0110312230.htm. 
39 See, for example, Mehmet Ugur, “Freedom of Movement vs. Exclusion: A Reinterpretation of the ‘Insider’ 
– ‘Outsider’ Divide in the European Union,” International Migration Review 29.4 (1995): 964-999. 
40 Kate Connolly, “All Illegal Migrants Out, Says Haider,” The Guardian 25 Oct 2000.  
http://www.guardian.co.uk. 
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41 See Gallya Lahav, “Ideological and Party Constraints on Immigration Attitudes in Europe,” Journal of 
Common Market Studies.  35.3 (1997): 377-406. immigrants’ benefits as the means to accomplish these objectives, along with the 
curtailment of their right to bring in foreign spouses, and tightening of asylum policies.
42  
Recent polls in the Netherlands show that more than a third of young Dutch plan to vote for 
an openly racist far-right politician in this year’s general election who has promised to 
drastically cut down the number of immigrants and asylum seekers, and who has also been 
credited with turning immigration into an acceptable topic for political debate, i.e., 
politicizing it.
43     
 
The overriding objective of the migration policies is a spillover from the creation of 
the single market, which required lifting of internal controls.  To compensate for the lifting 
of these controls, external border controls have to be strengthened and standardized, and are 
accompanied by an array of measures designed to improve coordination within the 
Schengen area.  Since the mid-1980s, when freedom of movement was recognized as a key 
element of the internal market, cooperation among the member states on migration issues 
gradually increased, culminating in the integration of the Schengen acquis into the 
supranational first pillar of the European Union.   
 
These efforts to formulate common policies to deal with the anticipated problems, 
including the “flood” of immigrants from the former Eastern bloc, were spurred by the 
perception of a common threat.  For example, the eastern enlargement was arguably the 
most important factor behind the Justice and Home Affairs reform and its incorporation 
into the Treaty of Amsterdam. The Europeanization of policies in this area, and particularly 
the partial communitarization of the JHA pillar, enabled the member states to reinforce 
their restrictive policies and law-enforcement approach to immigration and to impose their 
security agenda on the candidates for enlargement as well.
44   
 
Enlargement itself can be seen as one such policy.  Lykke Friis argues that by 
enlarging the EU its borders would move to the east, effectively creating a cordon sanitaire 
between the member states and the near abroad, where the problems governments face are 
even more severe, while simultaneously giving the CEECs incentives to reduce the 
permeability of their borders and strengthen their judicial systems.  At the same time, 
however, by taking in these countries without preparing them to adopt and implement the 
JHA acquis, the EU would in fact be internalizing the very same problem against which it 
was trying to protect itself, facilitated by the visa-free regime, and the free movement of 
labor after accession.  By insisting that the candidates adopt the JHA acquis, the EU could 
postpone enlargement, and minimize the import of security problems once the CEECs 
became members.  In the meantime, growing stability in the region and resumed economic 
growth would reduce the number of immigrants.
45 
 
                                                           
 
42 Stephen Castle, “Neighbors Wary of Danish Voters’ Move to the Right,” The Independent  22 Nov 2001.  
http://www.independent.co.uk.; See also  Andrew Osborn, “Dutch Youth Back Far-Right Immigration 
Policy,” The Guardian  23 Feb 2002.  http://www.guardian.co.uk. “Editorial Comment: Danish Welcome,” 
Financial Times 6 Feb 2002.  http://www.ft.com. 
Andrew Osborn, “Dutch Youth Back Far-Right Immigration Policy,” The Guardian  23 Feb 2002.  
http://www.guardian.co.uk. 
43 Andrew Osborn, “Dutch Youth Back Far-Right Immigration Policy,” The Guardian  23 Feb 2002.  
http://www.guardian.co.uk. 
44 See Theodora Kostakopoulou, “The ‘Protective Union’: Change and Continuity in Migration Law and 
Policy in Post-Amsterdam Europe,” Journal of Common Market Studies.  38.3 (2000): 497-518. 
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45 Friis 5-7. As it stands now, the European Commission’s proposal stipulates a seven-year 
transition period for the free movement of labor after the accession of the CEEC, the same 
restriction that the Iberian countries were subjected to.  A number of factors, however, 
make the situation more complex than it may appear, namely, both immigration and the 
free movement of labor are essential if demographically aging Europe is to grow 
economically in the long run.  The problem of a declining working population along with a 
growing aging population
46 will make it even harder to sustain Europe’s welfare state 
without immigrant workers to help pay for it.  Many leaders are recognizing that the policy 
of “zero immigration” is no longer sustainable and the calls for the relaxation of 
immigration policies are growing.  Some governments are suggesting the possibility that 
they may open their doors immediately after accession or limit the transition periods to only 
a couple of years.  For instance, last fall the state premier of the länder of Saxony called the 
transition period “unrealistic and unsustainable,” and that “Western Europeans’ fear that 
cheap laborers from eastern Europe will flood their countries and take away their jobs are 
mainly due to ignorance.”
47  The estimates of potential migration into the EU from the 
candidate countries varies widely, ranging from 120,000 in the first year and declining to 
50,000 over the first 10 years, to 380,000 in the first year and declining to 200,000 over ten 
years.
48 Not only has the anticipated flood of immigrants not materialized, but the CEECs 
are no longer expected to be a major source of immigration capable of meeting the 
demographic needs of European markets. 
 
The events of September 11 and the crackdown on terrorist cells in Europe have 
given further legitimacy to the calls for curtailing immigration, which could influence the 
debate over the free movement of labor from the Central and Eastern European countries 
after their accession.  The European Union’s security is intimately linked with the way 
cooperation in the areas of immigration and asylum with the candidates for membership 
and, equally importantly, with its new near abroad.  Successful and effective regulation of 
these issue areas is key in preventing illegal immigration and perhaps trans-border crime.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The securitization of migration shows how political actors define the political debate on the 
issue, which can then be translated into policies that ultimately bear upon the criteria for 
membership in a particular group.  The possibility of large-scale migration from Central 
and Eastern Europe following the fall of the Berlin Wall led the EU to react by tightening 
its immigration and asylum policies.  These developments took place in conjunction with 
connecting immigration to terrorism, organized crime, and drug-trafficking, and thereby 
including it within the regulatory framework that dealt with issues of national security.  
Migration was thus transformed from a managerial issue into a security one, with policy 
implications.  This transformation was facilitated by the particular historical context as well 
                                                           
46 The European Commission estimates that the EU’s working population will decline to 223 million people 
by 2025 from 225 million in 1995, whereas the over-65 year olds will reach 22% of the population by 2025, 
up from 15% in 1995. Deborah Hargreaves, “Europe Reinvented Part One: Demography is Destiny for the 
Old World,” Financial Times 15 Jan 2001.  http://www.ft.com. 
47 “Premier Say Transition Periods Are Unrealistic,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung  4 Oct. 2001.  
http://www.faz.com. 
  14  
48European Commission.  Information Note: The Free Movement of Workers in the Context of Enlargement.  
Annex 3.  Brussels. (6 March 2001): 34.  The main recipients of these immigrants would be Germany with 
65%, followed by Austria with 12%.  “Will Western Europe Receive the Great Unwashed – One Day?” The 
Economist  2 May 2001.  http://www.economist.com. as by the desire of political elites to set the political agenda, which would then enable them 
to propose means for solution.  The securitization of migration also blurs the boundaries 
between legitimate governance and political exploitation of the issue.   
 
  The debate on immigration and asylum is also about the criteria for legitimate 
belonging in a particular group.  Cultural identity is considered the most important factor in 
the survival of society as the sets of ideas, customs, and practices which large groups share 
indicate the perseverance of these identity groups.  The right to welfare provisions is also 
linked to membership in a group - in this case, citizenship – and reinforced by identity in 
the political discourse.  This paper has argued that the securitization of immigration from 
Central and Eastern Europe has occurred mainly along the latter criteria, as it was seen as a 
danger to the socioeconomic welfare of West European societies in general.    This concurs 
with the European Union’s official argument that enlargement is about ending the division 
of the continent to ensure peace and prosperity.     
  
Migration has taken on a new importance following the events of September 11
th.  
The focus on combating terrorism, while vitally important, carries the risk of an increased 
selectiveness of the applicability of the right to asylum and immigration in the name of 
national security.  That is why the seemingly inevitable eastern enlargement necessitates 
further efforts in assisting the Central and Eastern European candidates to strengthen their 
borders.  Cooperation with its new buffer zone of candidate countries and especially with 
its new near abroad, without creating a new dividing line on the continent is thus vital for 
the European Union. 
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